In an exchange economy under uncertainty with two periods, one physical good, and finitely many states of the world, we show that for every (complete or incomplete) market span there exists a sequence of securities such that if they are introduced into markets one by one, the prices of any security is not affected by the subsequent introduction of newer securities and they together generate the given market span. Since these securities generate no pecuniary externalities, this result implies that every stage of such sequential financial innovations is Pareto-improving. Its implications on financial innovations via voting are also explored.
Introduction
General equilibrium theory of incomplete security markets has flourished during the last couple of decades, and much of the contributions are surveyed in Magill and Shafer (1991) and Magill and Quizii (1996) . While the non-existence and inefficiency of equilibria in incomplete markets have been thoroughly investigated, a relatively unexplored topic is financial innovation. Most of the contributions in the field take a set of tradeable securities as exogenously given, without explaining how they have come to be traded. Exceptions are Duffie and Jackson (1989) , Allen markets and each trader simultaneously votes for or against the introduction of the proposed security. The proposed security will be introduced if and only if all traders unanimously vote for its introduction. Although this proposal-vote phase will be repeated infinitely many times, the market span generated by the approved securities can be reached after some finitely many phases, because there are only finitely many states of the world. The approved securities are then traded as in the standard models in general equilibrium theory of incomplete security markets, taking those securities as if they were exogenously given. The payoffs to the traders are the utility levels that they enjoy at equilibrium. The payoff to the innovator is arbitrary, as long as, just like the traders' payoff functions, it is uniquely determined by the resultant market span, not by which securities generate it or in which order they are proposed and approved of.
For this voting game of sequential financial innovations, we characterize the Nash and subgame perfect equilibria. Using this characterization and the existence of sequentially Paretoimproving securities, we show that the proposer has the advantage of agenda control, in the sense that he can introduce the securities that generate the market span of his highest payoff (among all the market spans). Recall that for a security to be introduced into markets, it needs to be unanimously approved of by the traders. What is surprising on this result is, therefore, that although the unanimity requirement seems to significantly limit the possibility of financial innovations, the innovator can still attain the most desirable outcome, regardless of his and the traders' payoff functions.
Let us now review the literature on the welfare consequence of introduction of new securities in markets. Introduction of new securities enhance risk-hedging opportunities, but it may cause unfavorable changes in the prices for the existing securities for some traders. If this negative pecuniary externality dominates the (direct) benefit of enhanced risk-hedging opportunities, such traders get worse off and, thus, introduction of new securities does not lead to Paretoimproving equilibrium allocations. Indeed, in models with sequential trades, Hart (1975) and Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) gave examples where all traders get worse off. Cass and Citanna (1998) and Elul (1995) went one step further by establishing the following result: If there are sequential trades and the numbers of the existing securities and of the (types of) traders are sufficiently smaller than that of the states of the world, then, whatever the existing securities are, it is generically possible to make all traders simultaneously better off or worse off by introducing an appropriately chosen new security.
The case without sequential trades, which we investigate in this paper, is more fortunate.
Since there is no spot market, the constrained efficiency implies that it is impossible that all traders are made worse off by introducing a new security. It is, however, still non-trivial to show that all traders can be made better off. Using a similar assumption on the numbers of existing securities, states, and traders and a similar proof method to those in Cass and Citanna (1998) and Elul (1995) , Elul (1999) showed that it is generically possible to make all consumers better off by introducing an appropriately chosen new security, whatever the existing securities are. Since our first main result (Theorem 1) implies that markets can be made complete by introducing some S securities in an appropriate order, it does not require that the number of the existing securities be sufficiently smaller than the number of states to guarantee the existence of a Pareto-improving security. It does not impose any upper bound on the number of traders, either. Our results, however, do not guarantee the existence of a Pareto-improving security when the existing securities are arbitrarily specified. Our and their results should, therefore, be understood as complementary to one another.
In concluding the introduction, we should note that the intellectual debt to Andreu MasColell is evident throughout this paper. Indeed, the subsequent analysis depends, directly and indirectly, on Mas-Colell (1986), Mas-Colell (1987), Hirsh, Magill, Mas-Colell (1990), Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell (1990), and Gottardi and Mas-Colell (2000) . Without his contribution to general equilibrium theory of incomplete security markets, this paper would not have been possible. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of security markets.
Section 3 establishes the existence of Pareto-improving financial innovations. Section 4 shows that generically, along every sequence of securities with invariant equilibrium prices, each security makes at least one trader strictly better off. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of the voting game of sequential financial innovations. Section 6 summaries our results and suggests directions of future research. The appendix justifies our proof method, which might appear to be overly mathematical.
Model
There are two consumption periods. There is no uncertainty in the first period and there are S possible states of the world in the second period, indexed s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}. The first period is indexed s = 0. There is only one physical good in every period and state.
Each consumer (or trader ), indexed i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I}, is characterized by his utility function u i : R + ×R S + → R and endowment vector (e 0i , e i ) ∈ R×R S . We assume throughout this paper that every consumer's consumption set is the nonnegative orthant, u i is continuous, strongly monotone, and strictly quasi-concave, 1 and (e 0i , e i ) ∈ R ++ × R S ++ . A security is characterized by its second-period dividend vector a ∈ R S . It is traded in the first period with other securities as well as with the first-period consumption.
Suppose that J securities (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a J ) are available for trade. Using the first-period consumption as the numeraire, we denote the security prices in the vector form q = (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q J ) ∈ R J . This is a security price vector. The maximization problem of consumer i is
(1)
1 These assumptions exclude some important utility functions, such as those exhibiting constant relative risk aversion greater than or equal to one. As we will see later, all we need is to guarantee that the net demands are single-valued and continuous when the wealth is strictly positive. This property could be derived even when the strong monotonicity and strict quasi-concavity restricted on the strictly positive orthant, given the strict positivity of initial endowments.
A security price vector q and an allocation of first-period consumptions and securities, 1 , a 2 , . . . , a J ) to mean span {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a J }. By the strong monotonicity of utility functions and strict positive of initial endowments, for every equilibrium security price vector q ∈ R J , there exists a p ∈ R S ++ such that p · z = q · y whenever z ∈ R S , y ∈ R J , and z = J j=1 y j a j . A security structure and an equilibrium security price vector can thus be identified with a linear subspace of R S and a vector in R S ++ , which we refer to as a market span and a state price vector. Using this correspondence between the portfolios y and the second-period consumption z, and writing G = span {a 1 , . . . , a J }, we can rewrite the maximization problem (1) as follows: max 
Pareto Improvement and Invariant Equilibrium Prices
In this section, we present the first main results of this paper. We start by defining a sequentially (weakly) Pareto-improving financial innovations as follows. 
with the product topology of the topologies of Grassmann manifolds. The following definition is equivalent to Definition 1 but given in terms of market span and state prices. of G j such that
The first main result of this paper claims that for every market span, there is a WPIP sequence of financial innovations. Since the first-period consumption is the numeraire, the IEPP implies "value conservation" of Hakansson (1982) . The following definition is equivalent to Definition 3 but is given in terms of market spans and a state price vector. Any sequence having the IEPP is referred to simply as an IEPP sequence. Along any IEPP sequence, the budget sets of the utility maximization problems (1) and (2) increase monotonically. An easy revealed preference argument, similar to the one in Hakansson (1982) , then shows that every IEPP sequence is a WPIP sequence. To establish Theorem 1, therefore, it is sufficient to prove the following proposition, which claims that every market span G can be arrived at by some IEPP sequence starting from the zero security case. Technically, it is the most important result in this paper.
For every
Definition 4 Let J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}. A (G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G J ) ∈ F 1,
Proposition 1
1. For every J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S} and every G ∈ G J,S , there exists an IEPP
For every J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S} and every
Before proving this proposition, we should mention that although every IEPP sequence is a WPIP sequence, a WPIP sequence need not be an IEPP sequence. However, as is shown in the appendix, in economies in which there are many consumers with varieties of utility functions, any WPIP sequence must necessarily be an IEPP. We can, therefore, say that invoking the existence of an IEPP sequence does not excessively complicate our proof of the existence of an WPIP sequence.
To prove Proposition 1, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, p ∈ R S ++ , and G ∈ G , denote by z i (p, G) ∈ R S the second period consumption of the solution to the maximization problem (2) . Define Second, let π : R J → G be a linear isometry and define a section σ of Ξ J by In closing this section, we give some remarks on the results.
Proof of Lemma 1 First, consider the vector bundle
Remark 1 (The First Period Consumption) We have so far assumed that consumption takes place in both the first and second periods. All the results, however, apply when consumption takes place only in the second period and the first period is the mere trading period. For example, in the absence of the first period consumption, part 1 of Proposition 1 is modified as follows.
Proposition 2 For every G ∈ G and
One can think of G 1 in Proposition 2 as being spanned by some nonzero, nonnegative security, such as the riskless bond and any Arrow security. While the proposition allows for an arbitrary
it is important to notice that this arbitrariness does not give rise to any essential multiplicity of the IEPP sequences. To see this, such that
for every i ≥ 1. This property, which we refer to as LBP, standing for the "the Last is the Best"
Property, means that the equilibrium allocation of the last market span G = span {a 1 Remark 3 (Sequence Starting from an Arbitrary Market Span) While we have shown that an arbitrary market span can be arrived at along some WPIP sequence starting from the no security case, we have not discussed whether it would be possible to construct an IEPP or WPIP sequence starting from an arbitrary market span. Given that there are certain types of assets, such as stocks and bonds, of which the prime function is not to facilitate risk-sharing (as would be the case for futures contracts) but to raise funds, the normative implications would be much richer if our results could be extended to the case where they are already traded securities.
Such an extension would also fill in the gap between our approach and the approach of Cass and Citanna (1998) and Elul (1995 Elul ( , 1999 , who took some collection of traded securities as given and asked whether it is possible to introduce one security to bring about a Pareto-improving allocation.
It is unfortunate but should not be surprising that such an extension is impossible, in view of recent developments to solve the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle. For example, Hara and Kajii (2006) found restrictions on utility functions, which are of constant absolute risk aversion type but allow for recursivity and multiple-priors, under which the riskfree bond price goes down (and hence the risk-free interest rate goes up) every time a new security is introduced. It is then easy to see, as proved in the appendix, that a consumer for whom the newly introduced security does not provide any extra risk-hedging opportunities and the changes in the interest rate or equity premium is unfavorable would get worse off. We can therefore conclude that it is impossible to guarantee the existence of an IEPP or WPIP sequence staring from an arbitrary market span.
Genericity of Pareto Improvement
In this section we show that, in almost every economy, along every IEPP sequence, every time a new security is introduced, some consumer becomes strictly better off. The genericity argument of this section owes much to Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell (1990) . The following definition of Pareto improvement property is given for a sequence of market spans, but, of course, an analogous definition can also be given to a sequence of securities. Pareto efficient, then, for every market span, the only equilibrium is the no trade equilibrium, and hence no consumer becomes strictly better off as the market span is enhanced. One should thus aim at establishing that every IEPP sequence is generically a PIP sequence.
Note that Definition 5 does not require every consumer to become strictly better off at every stage of span enhancement. There is indeed an example of utility functions such that, regardless of initial endowments, there always exists an IEPP sequence along which some consumer does not become strictly better off at some stage of span enhancement; and hence it is impossible to guarantee, even on a generic set of initial endowments, that every consumer becomes strictly better off at every stage of span enhancements along every IEPP sequence.
The CAPM is one such example: Oh (1996) showed, in our terminology, that every element of F 1,S is an IEPP sequence in the CAPM. To construct an IEPP sequence along which some consumer does not become strictly better off at every stage, fix any particular consumer i and denote by z S i ∈ R S his excess demand for the second-period consumption at the complete market equilibrium. If z S i = 0, then he does not trade at all on any market span and thus does not become strictly better off by any span enhancement. If z S i = 0, then define G 1 ∈ G 1,S to be the line spanned by z S i and then define (G 2 , . . . , G S ) so that (G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G S ) ∈ F 1,S , then his equilibrium consumption in the the second period remains to be z 1 i all along the sequence. Hence he does not become strictly better off when G 1 is further enhanced.
In the rest of this section, the consumers' utility functions u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u I remain fixed and an economy is identified with a vector ((e 01 , e 1 ) , . . . , (e 0I , e I )) ∈ (R ++ × R S ++ ) I of initial endowments. We make the following additional assumptions on the utility functions:
, e i )) ∈ R S be the second-period consumption (excess demand) of the solution to the maximization problem (2) . Then z i is sufficiently many times differentiable (when restricted on each R S ++ × G J,S × (R ++ × R S ++ )) so that the subsequent transversality argument can be justified.
++ is stronger than we need; and it excludes utility functions exhibiting constant relative risk aversion less than one. All we need here is to guarantee that the demands are always in R++ × R S ++ .
The following theorem states that if there are sufficiently numerous consumers, then, generically in the space of initial endowments, every IEPP sequence is a PIP sequence. ((e 01 , e 1 ), . . . , (e 0I , e I ) ) is a PIP sequence.
To prove this theorem, define , e 1 ) , . . . , (e 0I , e I )))
The following lemma constitutes the basis of our application of the transversality theorem. by perturbing (e 0i , e i ) in the direction of (p · v, −v) and perturbing (e 0I , e I ) in the direction of
/// Proof of Theorem 2 By Lemma 2 and the transversality theorem, for every J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}, there exists a subset E J of (R ++ × R S ++ ) I , with the complement of zero measure, such that for every ((e 01 , e 1 ) , . . . , (e 0I , e I )) ∈ E J , the partial mapping F J (·, ·, ((e 01 , e 1 ) , . . . , (e 0I , e I ))) :
. . , 0, 0) as a regular value. By our assumption on I,
Hence, in fact, for every ((e 01 , e 1 ), . . . , (e 0I , e I )) ∈ E J there is no , e 1 ) , . . . , (e 0I , e I )) ∈ E J , every G ∈ G J,S , and every complete market equilibrium state price vector p ∈ R S ++ , the first I − 1 consumers' excess demands for the second period consumption, z 1 (p, G, (e 01 , e 1 )) , . . . , z I−1 (p, G, (e 0,I−1 , e I−1 ) ), span G. ((e 01 , e 1 ), . . . , (e 0I , e I )) ∈ E and (G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G J ) ∈ F 1,J be an IEPP sequence. Then E is open with the complement of zero measure, and for every j ≤ J, there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , I − 1} such that z i (p, G j , (e 0i , e i ) ) / ∈ G j−1 . By the strict quasi concavity of u i and the revealed preference argument, this implies that consumer i becomes strictly better off as the market span is enhanced from G j−1 to G j . Hence E has the desired property. ///
Voting Game of Sequential Financial Innovations
In this section, we present a dynamic game in which there is a player, called the proposer, who
proposes introducing a new security, and each consumer can vote for or against introducing the proposed security. Then, we characterize the Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium in terms of a condition similar to LBP defined in Remark 2 and show, using Theorem 1, that the proposer has the advantage of agenda control, in the sense that he can attain the highest utility among those he can possibly enjoy from introducing securities, as long as he can propose to introduce securities in any order he likes.
In our formulation of sequential financial innovations, there are 1+I players, of which player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} is a consumer as in the security market model of Section 2, and player 0 is an extra player, who proposes to introduce securities of any type in any order he wishes. A proposed security is introduced if it is unanimously approved of by the consumers, and the securities thus introduced will be traded in markets in the way described in Section 2. 3 Under the assumptions set out at in Section 2, for every collection of securities, there exists an equilibrium security price vector; and for every market span, there exists an equilibrium state price vector. Throughout this section, we assume that these equilibrium price vectors are essentially unique.
Assumption 1 For every G ∈ G , if p ∈ R S
++ and p ∈ R S ++ are equilibrium state price vectors of the market span G, then p · z = p · z for every z ∈ G.
We can then define v i (G) as consumer i's equilibrium utility level, that is, the maximum of the 3 In fact, it is not necessary to assume that all the consumers in the security market model of Section 2 vote. The subsequent argument is valid even if the voting right is granted only to a subset of consumers in the model of Section 2.
following utility maximization problem under any equilibrium state price vector p of G:
As for the utility function of the proposer, we assume that it depends on the market span generated by the introduced securities, but not on the securities themselves that generate the market span or the order in which they are introduced. That is, the utility function of the proposer is given by a function v 0 : G → R. For example, if the proposer is a benevolent social planner, then he may have the utilitarian social welfare function v 0 (G) = i≥1 v i (G).
Also, just like Allen and Gale (1991), we could assume that the proposer is an entrepreneur who issues several claims against his assets to maximize the revenue, in terms of the firstperiod consumption, from the sales of these claims, subtracted by the costs of issuing these claims. Specifically, suppose that the proposer has some underlying assets (initial endowments) e 10 ∈ R S and can issue any claims at some cost, which is a function τ : G → R of the market spans. Then define his utility function v 0 by v 0 (G) = p · e 10 − τ (G) whenever e 10 ∈ G and p is an equilibrium state price vector of G. 4 The game we shall consider has discrete time periods, or stages. At each odd stage, the proposer proposes a security, and the voters make no move. At each even stage, the voters simultaneously vote for or against the introduction of the security proposed at the previous stage, while the proposer makes no move. Then the securities of which the introduction have been unanimously approved of are traded by the voters in the way described in Section 2. , σ 1 , . . . , σ i−1 , σ i+1 , . . . , σ I ) . A subgame is identified by a t ≥ 1 and a c t−1 ∈ C t−1 , from which it starts. To distinguish subgames from the original game, which starts from b 0 , we sometimes refer to the latter as the entire game. A Nash equilibrium of a subgame can be defined analogously to one for the entire game. A subgame perfect equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the entire game is a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the entire game, whose restriction to every subgame is also a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the subgame.
The description so far is an abstract formulation of a game in extensive form with almost perfect information. We now move on to describe the specifics of our voting game.
For every i ≥ 0, let B 0 i be any singleton; for every odd t ≥ 1, let B t 0 = R S ; for every odd t ≥ 1 and every i ≥ 1, let B t i be any singleton; for every even t ≥ 2, let B t 0 be any singleton; and for every even t ≥ 2 and every i ≥ 1, let B t i = {1, −1}. The Euclidean space R S is interpreted as the set of the dividend vectors of all securities. The zero vector 0 of R S is referred to as the zero security. Since it does not enhance any market span, by proposing it, the proposer essentially shows his intention not to introduce any security at that stage. The set {1, −1} is interpreted as representing two possible choices for voting, 1 being the voting for the introduction of a proposed security, while −1 being voting against it. Since B i 0 is a singleton for every even t, to specify a strategy of player 0, it suffices to determine σ t 0 for each odd t. Similarly, to specify a strategy of player i ≥ 1, it suffices to determine σ t i for each even t ≥ 2. η(π)) ). This means that every player's payoff is determined by the market span generated by the securities that are unanimously approved of, and is independent of which securities generate the span or in which order they are proposed. 5 Note that since R S is of finite dimension, span Ξ(η(π)) is well defined even when |J | is infinite, and, thus, there always exists a finite J * such that span Ξ(η(π)) = span 0, b
The following theorem is the second main result of this paper. It shows that the proposer has the advantage of agenda control, in the sense that if he proposes "right" securities in the "right" order, then he can attain his most preferred market span. To prove this theorem, we first need the following definition. 0 , a 1 , . . . , a J ) of securities (where J may be infinite) has the extended last-is-best property (ELBP for short) if v i (span {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a j }) ≤ v i (span {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a J }) for every j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J} and every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I}.
Definition 6 A finite or infinite sequence (a
ELBP is similar to but different from LBP, defined in Remark 2, in that ELBP respects the proposer's payoff while LBP does not, and ELBP may involve redundant securities while LBP must not. In fact, we often take a 0 = 0 in the above definition, as in the case of (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a J ) = Ξ(c) for some c ∈ C. The following proposition shows that ELBP is sufficient for Nash and subgame perfect equilibria. 6 
Proposition 3
1. For every ELBP sequence (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a J ) , where a 0 = 0 and J may be infinite, there exists a Nash equilibrium σ of the voting game of sequential financial 
If
so that the players take the agreed actions b t i whenever the agreed history c t−1 has been realized, and, otherwise, the proposer proposes the zero security (that is, chooses 0 ∈ R S ) and the the voters vote against the introduction of any security (that is, choose −1 ∈ {1, −1}). We prove that if I ≥ 2, then σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the voting game of sequential financial innovations such that Ξ(η(σ)) = (0, a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a J ) . To do so, for any t ≥ 1 and , b t−1 , . . . ), 6 The proof of the theorem owes much to a comment by Tadashi Sekiguchi. 7 As noted in Footnote 3, the voters may constitute only a subset of consumers in the security market model of Section 2. What this assumption excludes is, thus, the case of a single voter, not just a single-consumer economy. 8 We do not need to specify b and write c = ( c t−1 , b t , b t+1 , . . . ). To prove that σ is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame following the history c t−1 , we need to show that To prove that σ is a Nash equilibrium even when I = 1, it suffices to show that no player i ≥ 0 can increase his payoff by changing his strategy from σ i to σ i on the entire game. The entire game corresponds to the case of t = 1 in the above proof and, trivially, c 0 = c 0 . For the case where c t−1 = c t−1 , the proof did not use the assumption that I ≥ 2. Therefore, it shows that σ is a Nash equilibrium even when I = 1.
///
We can now prove Theorem 3 by using Proposition 3. 
Proof of Theorem 3 If
for every i ≥ 0 and j < J.
Let i ≥ 1 and j < J. Let σ i be a strategy that is identical to σ i except on the subgame following the history
, where he always rejects the introduction of any security.
. This is equivalent to (6) .
As for the proposer, let σ 0 be a strategy that is identical to σ 0 except on the subgame follow-
, where he always proposes the zero security. Let
. Since σ is a Nash equilibrium,
. This is equivalent to (6) . ///
Conclusion
We have considered whether it is possible to introduce new securities into markets to make all consumers better off. We have shown that for any specification of utility functions and initial endowments, and for any given market span, complete or not, there is a sequence of securities that, if introduced one by one, eventually generate the given market span and make no consumer worse off at any stage. We have also presented a dynamic game in which there is a player, called the proposer, who proposes introducing a new security, and each consumer can vote for or against introducing the proposed security. We have then proved that the proposer has the advantage of agenda control.
There are some unsolved issues in our investigation. Imagine that there is a continuum of consumers. Specifically, the set of (the names of)
consumers is given by a probability space (R S , B(R S ), µ), where B(R S ) is the Borel σ-field of R S and µ is a Borel measure on R S with full support (that is, the support of µ coincides with the entire R S ). For example, we can take µ to be a S-dimensional normal distribution. for every ( x 0 , x) ∈ R + × R S + . This means that all consumers have expected utility functions exhibiting the same risk attitudes, but their probabilistic beliefs over the S states and time discount rates between the two periods differ in the way described by the probability measure µ. Let ( e 0 , e) ∈ R ++ ×R S ++ . We take this to be the initial endowment vector for each consumer. Thus all the consumers have the same initial endowment vector.
We show that in this example economy, every WPIP sequence is an IEPP sequence. To do so, it suffices to prove that for all G ∈ G , G ∈ G , p ∈ R S ++ , and p ∈ R S ++ , if G ⊂ G , p is an equilibrium state price vector of G, p is an equilibrium state price vector of G , and there exists a z ∈ G such that p · z = p · z, then there is a group of consumers with positive measure who are strictly worse off at the equilibrium of G than at the equilibrium of G. In other words, let (w ι , z ι ) be the solution to the utility maximization problem (2) when the market span is G and the state price vector is p, and let (w ι , z ι ) be the solution to the utility maximization problem (2) when the market span is G and the state price vector is p . We wish to prove that u ι ( e 0 + w ι , e + z ι ) > u ι e 0 + w ι , e + z ι
for a set of ι's with positive measure. Indeed, we can assume without loss of generality that for every s = 1, . . . , S. Thus (−p · z, z) is the solution to the utility maximization problem (2) of consumer ι * when the market span is R S (complete markets) and the state price vector is p .
Since z ∈ G and G ⊂ G , z ∈ G and hence (w ι * , z ι * ) = (−p · z, z). Moreover, since p · z < p · z, u ι * ( e 0 − p · z, e + z) > u ι * e 0 + w ι * , e + z ι * .
Since (−p · z, z) satisfies the constraint of (2) when the market span is G and the state price vector is p, u ι * ( e 0 + w ι * , e + z ι * ) ≥ u ι * ( e 0 − p · z, e + z) .
Thus u ι * ( e 0 + w ι * , e + z ι * ) > u ι * e 0 + w ι * , e + z ι * .
Since the values of both sides depend continuously on ι, (7) holds for every ι sufficiently close to ι * . Since µ has full support, (7) holds for a set of ι's with positive measure. We can therefore conclude that the IEPP and WPIP are equivalent properties in economies with varieties of characteristics.
Let's discuss the first step. We established the existence of an IEPP sequence by constructing a vector bundle whose mod 2 Euler number is one and then using the fact that every continuous section of such a vector bundle intersects the zero section at least once (Lemma 1). One might wonder if there is a more elementary proof. To argue that there seems none, let p ∈ R S ++ and G ∈ G J,S . To prove the existence of an IEPP sequence, we want to find a G * ∈ G J−1,S such that G * ⊂ G and p is an equilibrium state price vector of G * . Such a market span G * exists if and only if the section C → (C, π −1 (z(p, π(C)))) in the proof of Lemma 1 intersects with the zero section at least once. Hence the question of whether our mathematical machinery is unnecessarily powerful boils down to that of whether the section C → π −1 (z(p, π(C))) has any other property than continuity. If there is no such property, then the existence of an IEPP sequence is mathematically equivalent to the zero intersection property on a mod 2 vector bundle, and, therefore, there is no fundamentally different approach other than the use of mod 2 Euler number. This latter question was posed by Mas-Colell (1986) in the context of the pseudo equilibrium existence problem in incomplete security markets. Recent answers to this question, such as those in Gottardi and Mas-Colell (2000) and Chiappori and Ekeland (1999) , point to the infinitesimal and local arbitrariness of the section beyond continuity. 10 It would therefore be safe to conclude that our mathematical machinery was the right one to prove the existence of an IEPP sequence.
